Top of the stocks: Why gambling shares have lost their shine
For years, the gambling industry’s investment story was built on a simple promise: more betting would mean more growth. That story is now becoming harder to sell.
Entain’s removal from the FTSE 100 is a telling sign of what has happened to gambling stocks across both Europe and the US in recent years. The company’s shares have fallen sharply over the past year, even as its first-half results showed continued growth in several important markets.
In the six months to June, Entain’s online net gaming revenue rose 7% in constant currency. Revenue in Britain and Ireland increased 13%, while the company maintained its full-year guidance for online net gaming revenue growth of 5% to 7%. So why is its stock price still so under pressure?
One answer is that the industry is no longer being valued primarily on the promise of endless growth. The market instead wants to see profit, cash generation and manageable regulation maintained across all facets of a listed business. Ed Birkin, managing director of H2 Gambling Capital, says the longer-term decline in gambling stocks runs much deeper than just changes to earnings forecasts.
“The industry share price declines have been much more severe than the cut to earnings projections which means that, while there may be some weakening in some companies’ fundamental growth drivers, the valuations that investors are putting on them have been the main driver of share price declines – although weaker fundamentals lead to lower valuations, so the reality is that they’re completely intertwined.”
London is not the whole problem
Entain’s demotion comes after another – and arguably more significant – symbolic move by Flutter Entertainment. Flutter began trading on the New York Stock Exchange in January 2024 and later moved its primary listing from London to New York.
The move initially appeared to work. Flutter had a market capitalisation of about $36 billion when it began trading in New York in January 2024, rising to roughly $50 billion by June the following year. Flutter’s value later fell sharply as investors lowered their earnings expectations.
In the second quarter of 2026, Flutter’s US revenue fell 6% to $1.683 billion, while sportsbook revenue fell 15%. US adjusted EBITDA fell sharply, and Flutter subsequently reduced its guidance. Despite this, FanDuel retained the number-one US sportsbook position, with Flutter reporting a 39% share of US sportsbook gross gaming revenue.
Ben Robinson, managing partner at Corfai, argues that the American listing achieved what it was supposed to achieve. The problems came afterwards. “The question was which arm of the K-shaped market Flutter would end up on. We have the answer now. Capital is concentrated in a narrow band of technology names and everything else is being marked on earnings.”
A US listing can improve access to capital without making the underlying business more attractive. London has a capital-markets problem. Gambling has an investment problem. The two overlap, but they are not the same thing.
The growth story has become harder to sell
Frank Fantini, founder and publisher emeritus of Eilers-Fantini, thinks the change began before Covid. “There is a tendency to look at the world as pre-Covid and post-Covid,” he says. “But the decline in gaming began earlier than that with the slowdown in new jurisdictions and new projects.”
The US land-based casino market had begun to mature and the number of obvious new markets and projects was shrinking. Online gambling offered a new source of growth, particularly through the expansion of legal sports betting. That opportunity was quickly reflected in share prices.
The problem is that legalisation has not happened as quickly as expected, while taxes and competition have increased. “Online gaming has been affected by the broader re-rating of growth-oriented internet and software stocks,” says Chad Beynon, managing director and head of US research at Macquarie Capital. “But there has also been a genuine deterioration in expectations for parts of the sector.”
Beynon says sports betting companies have suffered particularly badly because the market is questioning both future earnings and the size of the eventual opportunity. More iGaming-focused companies such as Rush Street Interactive and Super Group have generally performed better operationally, helped by stronger earnings growth and profitability.
The lesson is simple: gambling still attracts capital when the money is visible. It is less attractive when the payoff lies far in the distance.
Prediction markets have changed the argument
The biggest new uncertainty in US sports betting is prediction markets. The American Gaming Association estimates that Americans will legally wager $29.5 billion in betting handle through US regulated commercial sportsbooks during the 2026 NFL season, broadly unchanged from the $29.4 billion handle recorded in 2025. These figures refer to the amount wagered, not sportsbook revenue.
Robinson calls prediction markets “the main event”. His argument is not simply that US customers are moving from sportsbooks to prediction markets. The more important point is that sportsbooks no longer have the relatively protected market that was once assumed.
Kalshi, Robinhood, Crypto.com and DraftKings’ own prediction-market operation are all competing for activity around sporting events. Beynon says prediction markets are having a larger effect on valuations than on fundamentals so far.
The existence of a new competitor does not automatically mean sportsbook revenue will collapse. But valuations do not require proof of collapse to fall. A loss of confidence in future growth can be enough.
And now sportsbooks are joining the prediction market race themselves. DraftKings has moved into the market, while Flutter is also developing its presence. That could make prediction markets an additional source of revenue rather than a straightforward threat.
But it also requires investment at exactly the time shareholders are demanding better returns. Flutter’s recent results illustrate the tension. US adjusted EBITDA fell sharply in the first half of 2026, while the company continues to invest in FanDuel Predicts and other initiatives aimed at future growth.
Entain has a different problem
But in the UK Entain’s share price weakness is less about prediction markets and more about tax, debt and confidence.
The company reported approximately £3.6 billion of net debt at the end of June, with reported leverage of 3.1x underlying EBITDA. Online underlying EBITDA fell 5% in the first half despite 7% growth in online net gaming revenue. The tax impact has been substantial.
The UK government increased Remote Gaming Duty (RGD) from 21% to 40% from 1 April. Then from April 2027, a new 25% General Betting Duty rate for remote betting will apply, although remote bets on UK horse racing are excluded from the new rate.
Entain said the higher RGD had a £56 million negative impact on first-half EBITDA. In Britain, operators are dealing with government policy and higher taxes. In America, the main threat is competition. The problems are different, but they hit the same group of stocks.
Entain is trying to respond by simplifying itself. It has agreed to sell an initial 20% stake in Entain CEE for €425 million, implying an enterprise value of about €2.1 billion. The company says proceeds from the transaction and any future exit will be used to reduce debt and, subject to leverage objectives, return excess capital to shareholders.
The strategy is less about rapid growth and more about showing that a cash-generating business with falling debt and improving operations is undervalued.
Four variation of the same problem
By looking at four major gambling companies – Entain, Flutter, DraftKings and MGM Resorts International – it becomes clear why the sector should not be treated as a single trade.
Flutter has arguably the strongest online franchise of the four. Its share price fell from $282.33 on 18 September 2025, to $89.56 on 18 September this year, with a market valuation of $15.54 billion.
FanDuel remains the leading US sportsbook, while Flutter’s international businesses provide additional sources of growth. But that quality comes with high expectations.
Beynon describes Flutter as “the highest-quality online betting franchise globally”, with FanDuel’s leadership position providing “significant long-term value”. The problem is that the market is increasingly questioning how much future earnings growth can be generated from that position as the industry matures.
DraftKings is a different proposition. Its share price went from $43.30 on 18 September 2025, to $21.75 upon market closure last week. Beynon says it “arguably offers the greatest operational upside if it can continue converting strong customer growth into sustained profitability”. Its prediction market strategy could also become an advantage if the new market proves complementary to sportsbook betting.
MGM Resorts International’s investment case is supported by Las Vegas, regional casinos, property assets and its 50% interest in BetMGM. Its own share price has been on a different journey to its online pureplay peers, having increased by 5% in a year, to $37.81 on 18 September.
“MGM offers a more diversified investment case, with BetMGM, regional gaming and Las Vegas operations reducing reliance on online sports betting alone,” says Beynon. Robinson makes the same point. “It is a Las Vegas and Macau property business with a betting JV attached, and that is precisely why it has held up.”
Entain sits somewhere between the two models. It has significant international scale and a valuable stake in BetMGM, but also more debt and greater exposure to UK taxation, as well as general regulatory turbulance across Europe.
The industry is not dying
The four analysts arrive at much the same broad conclusion, albeit by different routes.
For Birkin, the share-price decline has gone well beyond the deterioration in earnings expectations. Fantini sees the industry’s great growth phase as largely behind it. Beynon’s focus is on what the market can see today: earnings and cash flow, rather than promises of future sportsbook growth. And for Robinson, the weakness is no longer simply a matter of valuation. It is increasingly showing up in the fundamentals themselves.
Nobody is predicting the end of gambling. The market is still growing. Good operators are still making money. New products are emerging.
But what has changed is what shareholders want those companies to prove – and the price they are willing to pay for that proof.
Fantini points to land-based examples like Red Rock Resorts and Monarch Casino as companies that can still attract capital because they offer sensible growth and strong management. That is a telling comparison with the industry’s recent past.
London’s problems are real. Entain’s removal from the FTSE 100 and Flutter’s move away from its London primary listing are evidence of that. But Flutter’s experience in New York shows that changing the listing does not remove the pressure.
The deeper change is global.
The market has become more demanding in the sense that it is less interested in what gambling companies might earn one day and more interested in what they can earn now.