Why does the UK gambling industry keep shooting itself in the foot?

In the wake of their licence suspensions, announced a fortnight previously by the UK Gambling Commission, it is tempting to see the demise of BresBet and Bet St George as evidence that it is simply too easy to become a British gambling operator.

The two related businesses are associated with entrepreneur Nic Brereton and had only recently started operating under their own licences. BresBet was licensed in February 2025, while Bet St George received its licence in December and launched in March this year.

At launch six months ago, Brereton told iGB that Bet St George would use the experience he gained applying advanced data models in the medical sector to improve the customer experience in betting.

“Sometimes what data tells you is uncomfortable because it’s challenging the norm,” he said at the time. “For me [it’s about] where we can make some marginal differences by using player data and challenging the perspectives of what the industry thinks should and does happen.”

The Gambling Commission suspended both licences with immediate effect on 28 August after enquiries revealed suspected social responsibility and AML failings. Reviews are now taking place under section 116 of the Gambling Act 2005. But in the wake of the suspension, the two sites have bowed to the inevitable and shut down completely.

According to the Commission’s licensing registry, Bet St George surrendered its four gambling licences on 4 September. BresBet surrendered its own licences on the same date.

No published findings released

It is important to stress that the Commission has not published detailed findings or established that breaches occurred. Customers can still access their accounts and withdraw funds. Following the closures the sites still provided messaging about the suspended licences.

Even so, suspension is an unusually forceful intervention.

“In my experience, where compliance concerns can be satisfactorily addressed without suspending an operator’s licence, the Commission may allow the operator to implement remedial measures or an action plan while continuing to trade,” says Richard Williams, partner at Keystone Law, speaking before the news of the collapse of the businesses.

“The fact that suspension has been considered necessary in this case therefore indicates that the Commission presently considers the issues sufficiently significant to justify preventing the operators from continuing to offer gambling while its reviews are ongoing.”

For any consumer-facing businesses, a suspension is likely existential and such appears to have been the case here. But wider implications have to be considered before the two sites are binned forever.

Familiar failures

The Commission’s intervention followed hot on the heels of the £600,000 regulatory settlement with QuinnBet, announced eight days earlier.

Its findings contained an all-too-familiar combination of ineffective systems, delayed interventions and inadequate source-of-funds controls. One customer placed approximately 4,800 bets in one day and 7,000 the next without being flagged. Another, whose payslips showed monthly earnings of about £2,000, deposited and lost £9,000 in four days.

“What is striking here is the level of activity that apparently failed to trigger effective intervention,” Williams says. “These were obvious indicators requiring further scrutiny, and it is difficult to understand why they did not result in more effective intervention.”

He adds that the recurring weakness is often not an absence of policies but a failure to ensure “technology, algorithms and operational processes actually work in practice”. Some of the QuinnBet issues followed a platform migration, underlining the need to retest controls whenever systems change.

As QuinnBet is also licensed in Gibraltar, Williams expects its regulator to consider the UK’s findings under the jurisdiction’s strengthened Gambling Act 2025. That would not necessarily require a second sanction, but Gibraltar must satisfy itself that any underlying weaknesses have been addressed, he says.

QuinnBet is just the latest news.

This summer, the Commission reached settlements of £900,000 with Betfred over safer gambling failures, £4.75 million with Evolution over weaknesses in its AML risk assessment and supply-chain oversight, and £122,835 with Stakelogic after games were found to be running faster than permitted.

Taken together, the cases provide further ammunition for the anti-gambling lobby at a time when it is already facing political pressure, tax increases and demands for tighter restrictions. Each apparently avoidable failure makes it harder for the industry to argue that existing regulation is sufficient.

Settlements not a cost of doing business

Yet Dan Waugh, partner at Regulus Partners, pushes back against the idea that enforcement notices reveal a fundamentally non-compliant sector.

“Operators failing compliance checks is never a good look,” he says. Campaigners often claim that financial sanctions are priced in and that the Commission should revoke more licences, although Waugh does not believe operators view settlements merely as a cost of doing business.

Nor are regulatory breaches unique to gambling. Waugh notes that Tesco was fined more than £8 million for food hygiene failings in 2021, without parliamentarians demanding that it should be prevented from selling cornflakes.

“There are valid arguments to be made in relation to raising the barriers to licensing, but this may come at a cost of diminishing competition and entrepreneurship,” he says.

In any event, successive regulatory tightening and tax increases have already created a “reasonably effective deterrent” to market entry.

Enforcement wallpaper

There is a second complication. The relentless flow of Commission statements may eventually make enforcement less damaging rather than more.

“The regulatory failures are unhelpful but perhaps the sheer number and regularity of them has made them less remarkable, such that they become ‘wallpaper’,” Waugh says.

He argues that some lawyers and licensees believe the Commission’s presentation of cases is detached from the operational reality but feel they have little option other than to accept the “regulator’s truth” when settling.

“The Commission’s approach to reporting may well create the inaccurate impression that the industry is inherently non-compliant,” he adds. A more balanced account might place failures alongside the majority of licensees that pass assessments or lead on customer wellbeing, although Waugh considers such a shift unlikely.

The “too easy to get a licence” argument doesn’t necessarily hold up to scrutiny, to be fair. Andrew Bentley, co-founder and CEO of regulatory technology startup LiSense, is one who rejects the suggestion.

“There are significant checks on individuals and businesses before a licence is granted,” he says. “The UK Gambling Commission has set out what it expects. If you want a licence in the UK, you need to meet those expectations.”

Doing the right thing

Bentley believes regulated operators are genuinely trying to do the right thing but says some mistakes could be mitigated through better automation and continuous monitoring. Enforcement statements also provide lessons that businesses should use to test their own exposure.

“It would be crazy to say that these cases are positive for the industry,” he says. “They will no doubt continue, but as an industry we need to try to reduce their frequency.”

Enforcement publicity may lack context, and some settlements may involve errors rather than systemic recklessness. But the sector cannot control how its opponents use these cases. It can only reduce the supply.

At a moment when the industry needs to persuade politicians that regulated gambling is capable of managing risk responsibly, repeated failures in long-established areas such as AML and safer gambling amount to political self-harm.

The Commission may sometimes load the gun, but operators keep providing the ammunition.